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No. 20120158 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY 
SAINTS, an Association of Individuals, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
THOMAS C. HORNE, BRUCE R. WISAN, MARK L. SHURTLEFF, 
HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG, and INTERVENORS, et al, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF'S REPLY BRIEF ON CERTIFIED QUESTION 
Utah Attorney General, Mark L. Shurtleff, respectfully submits his 
reply brief on a certified question of law. 
REPLY 
I. The Plaintiff Association Has Given No Reason to 
Deny the Certified Question. 
A. The certified question necessarily involves Lindberghs broader 
factual context. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of state 
preclusion law. That legal question does not ask what this Court meant in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Lindberg decision, nor does it ask for this Court to modify that decision. 
The question turns, instead, on whether a laches determination, in a 
procedural context like Lindberg, has preclusive effect in subsequent 
actions. 
To exercise its jurisdiction to answer that question, this Court need 
not examine the case in a vacuum. But by invoking this Court's 
jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit has asked the Court to opine on the legal 
question in the broader context in which the case arises. See Order 
Certifying State Law Questions, No. 11-4049 at pp. 10-11 (discussing 
Lindberg in the context of the certified question). That broader factual 
context is relevant here, because the very case that likely precludes the 
Plaintiff Association's claims is the case that must be analyzed to determine 
the certified question. 
This Court's answer to that question has significant import because 
the federal court is bound to apply Utah preclusion law. A federal court 
asked to determine whether a claim brought before it is precluded by a " 
previous state court decision must look to the preclusion principles of that \ 
rendering state. Marrese v. Am. Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 
U.S. 373, 380 (1985); "Carpenter v. Reed, 757 F.2d 218, 219(10thCir. < 
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1985) (federal courts are required by the full faith and credit clause to give 
res judicata effect to state judgments to the same extent the state would give 
such effect). 
This Court should reject the Plaintiff Association's attempt to 
conflate the issue. The question is whether, as a matter of state law, a 
decision such as Lindberg, has res judicata effect in a subsequent case. 
Stated differently, the Tenth Circuit seeks this Court's guidance to 
determine whether the Plaintiff Association is barred from raising its 
constitutional claims in federal court because a prior state court decision 
holding those claims are barred by laches has preclusive effect. The federal 
court and this Court do not apply different legal standards to that question. 
It is undisputed, and in fact well-settled, that the preclusive effect of 
Lindberg - however that issue is framed - is governed by Utah law. And, as 
the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized, where it is "crystal clear" that the 
federal and state court must "follow the same approach" to the same issues 
then "the issues in the two cases would indeed be the same." Smith v. Bayer 
Corp., 131 S, Ct. 2368, 2377 (2011). 
Moreover, Plaintiff Association's complaint, that asking this Court to 
determine whether Lindberg is entitled to preclusive effect requires this 
3 
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Court to clarify what it said or meant to say in Lindberg, is not new. But 
when raised in the context of the cases now-stayed before this Court, see 
case nos. 20090691-SC and 20091006-SC, at least one Justice rejected the 
Plaintiff Association's characterization of the question: "It's not just what 
did we mean in Lindberg! Or what did Justice Durrant and my colleagues 
mean in Lindberg! It's what are the standards and principles for res 
judicata and finality that apply to the state law question of whether that 
decision gets preclusive effect." Oral Argument Transcript April 12, 2011 
(Justice Lee at p. 13); see also id. at 25 ("Well no, it's not a question of 
what this Court meant in Lindberg at all.") 
To answer the certified question, this Court need not interpret its 
Lindberg decision. But the Court also need not decide the question outside 
the broader factual and procedural context in which the question came to it.1 
1
 A point, that even counsel for the Plaintiff Association apparently
 { 
concedes. Converse to the Association's claims here, describing this 
Court's decision in Gates v. Taylor, 997 P.2d 903 (Utah 2000) (per curiam), 
Mr. Parker stated: 
[W]e look to see if the- how the merits were handled in * 
the underlying case. If- how were they addressed, 
qualitatively, contextually, how were they addressed? 
And I think if you look at this Court's decisions with 
regard to laches, including the decisions it cited in { 
4 
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B. The fact of this Court's discretionary review is irrelevant. 
Res judicata is premised on the principle that claims and issues 
"should be adjudicated only once." Mack v. Utah State Dep 't of Commerce, 
2009 UT 47,129, 221 P.3d 194. And though the Plaintiff Association 
raised its constitutional claims before, it nonetheless argues that the fact this 
Court has already rejected those claims is irrelevant to resolving the same 
claims (or issues) in federal court. To this end, the Association contends 
that because the Court possessed discretion to address or not the viability of 
its claims in Lindberg somehow renders that decision meaningless. Such 
convoluted reasoning defies any attempt at concise summary, but it is worth 
noting that the Association does not provide any case law to support its 
theory. Instead, "[i]t is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata is 
applicable to a judgment in mandamus and prohibition proceedings, that is, 
that the special [i.e., discretionary] character of these proceedings does not, 
Lindberg [sic], that that's what you see, the Court 
qualitatively looking at it, trying to see, how was this 
addressed? 
Now, to me that's the status of Utah law. 
Oral Argument Transcript April 12, 2011 (Rod Parker at p. 25). 
5 
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ipso facto, preclude a judgment rendered therein from operating as res 
judicata in another action or proceedings." E.T. Tsai, Annotation, 
Judgment Granting or Denying Writ of Mandamus of Prohibition as Res 
Judicata, 21 A.L.R.3d 206, §§ 2-9 (1968 & Cum. Supp.) Accord State ex 
rel Kopchak v. Lime, 335 N.E.2d 700 (Ohio 1975) (prior order denying 
petition for writ of mandamus entitled to preclusive effect); State ex rel 
Campo v. Osborn, 10 A.2d 687 (Conn. 1940) (same); Kaufman v. Goldman, 
132 N.E.2d 52 (111 1956) (same); Lawrence v. CorbeilJe,l7S P. 834 (Idaho A 
1919) (prior order granting mandamus given preclusive effect). 
C. The record provides sufficient facts to allow this Court to 
decide the certified question. 
In a typical case, an appellate court is not a "fact-finder," but 
appellate courts do routinely comb trial court records for facts that support 
or undermine a trial court's decision. For example, in the context of 
summary judgment, the Court routinely examines the record developed 
< 
below. Namely, the Court considers the record as a whole, and reviews the 
district court de novo, reciting all facts and fair inferences from the record 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 
19, \ 17, 250 P.3d 56 (citing Shields v. Eli Lilly Co., 895 F.2d 1463, 1466 
:
 • ' • ••••• '•• . : - ; ' * • • ; ; - ' . \ i 
6 
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(D.C. Cir. 1990) ("on a paper record, an appellate court is equally well-
positioned as a trial judge to assess the evidence at issue.")); see also Poteet 
v. White, 2006 UT 63, fflf 7-8,147 P.3d 439. 
The same is true here, and in Lindberg itself. Like a court conducting 
de novo review of summary judgment, both then as now, this Court has 
before it thousands of pages comprising the court record in the UEP cases.2 
Moreover, the facts are simply not in dispute. \ 
Plaintiff Association does not dispute (1) that it had notice of the 
underlying United Effort Trust case, (2) that the Association failed to act for 
over three years despite that notice, and (3) that third parties suffered actual 
harm, having changed their positions due to the Association's inaction. The 
Association's objections come not from those facts, but from the legal 
2
 In the federal court, Judge Benson also did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing, but he based his contrary decision on the parties' 
written submissions alone. Not surprisingly, Plaintiff Association has no 
problem with the lack of "fact-finding" in that proceeding. This again, 
reflects a point on which at least one Justice from this Court agrees: "So it's 
a little odd to be criticizing this Court for making a laches decision without 
taking evidence where, as Justice Durrant points out, we were simply 
affirming factual findings and evidence that a trial court in our court - our 
state court system had taken - it's a little - it rings a little hollow, it seems 
to me, for you to criticize that, where Judge Benson himself didn't take any 
evidence on those issues." Oral Argument Transcript April 12, 2011 
(Justice Lee at p. 20). 
7 
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import of those facts. But when the parties were then before it, the record 
contained sufficient information and facts for the Lindberg Court to 
conclude that the Plaintiff Association's constitutional claims were barred 
by laches. Too, the Court has enough paper record before it now to decide 
the purely legal question of whether that laches defense, in the same 
procedural posture, can preclude subsequent litigation. To do so, this Court 
need not.act asa traditional "fact-finder." The Association's converse 
claim, necessarily fails.3 
D. The Association's structural limitation argument is not 
supported at law and it exceeds the scope of the certified question. 
The Plaintiff Association's final claim - that the several defendants 
violated a structural constraint imposed by the First Amendment's 
Establishment Clause to which laches may never apply - suffers from two, , 
fundamental flaws. £ee Plaintiff Association's Br. pp. 21-24. First, the 
alleged limits of a laches defense to the Association's Establishment Clause 
claims find no support in the law. Too, that argument goes the heart of this 
3
 Conceivably, when the petition in Lindberg was previously before * 
it, the Plaintiff Association could have moved this Court to supplement the 
factual record in that original proceeding. See Oral Argument Transcript, 
April 12, 2011 (colloquy between Justice Lee and SG Mitchell at pp. 43-
44). i 
8 
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Court's Lindberg decision and begs the Court directly reconsider the same. 
The Plaintiff Association points to no law to support its claim that 
laches may never bar a structural violation of the First Amendment. But for 
a party's unreasonable delay, laches can bar a First Amendment religion 
claim, as any other. See Southside Fair Housing Comm'n v. City of New 
York, 928 F.2d 1336, 1354-55 (2d Cir. 1991) (laches justified order denying 
relief to plaintiff claiming establishment clause and excessive entanglement 
violations); Likewise, laches pertains not simply to bar substantive 
adjudications, but also to bar preliminary injunctions. Accord City of 
Sherrill, N K v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 217 (2005); Nat 7 
Council of Arab Americans v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 265-
66 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
Moreover - and, ironically, as the Plaintiff Association has 
acknowledged - when a federal court certifies a question of state law that 
this Court accepts, the Court answers the question presented, but does not 
resolve the merits. See In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71, H 6, 99 P.3d 793. Here, the 
Association's claim that laches may never apply to a structural 
constitutional violation, goes not to the heart of that question, but to the 
propriety of this Court's conclusion Lindberg in the first instance. The 
9 
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claim exceeds the scope of the certified question. It must be ignored. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should answer the certified question affirmatively and 
hold that a laches determination in a procedural context like Lindberg has 
preclusive effect in subsequent cases. The Plaintiff Association's 
constitutional claims should be barred based on laches. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 21st day of May, 2012. 
^3djut^vm>=L 
BRIDGET K. ROMANO 
Utah^ SoJicitor General 
Attorney for Utah Attorney 
General Mark L. Shurtleff 
10 
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